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HERNANDEZ, BIVENS, AND  
THE SUPREME COURT’S EXPANDING  
THEORY OF JUDICIAL ABDICATION 
William J. Aceves* 
INTRODUCTION 
Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican child, was 
playing with his friends in Mexico when he was shot in the face by a U.S. 
Border Patrol Agent standing in the United States. Sergio died on the con-
crete ground where he fell. 
In Hernandez v. Mesa, Sergio’s family brought a federal lawsuit seeking 
to hold Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr. responsible for the death of their son.1 They al-
leged Agent Mesa had violated Sergio’s constitutional rights and based their 
claim on the Bivens doctrine.2 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court established a limited right to 
sue federal government officials for constitutional violations.3 Historically, 
damages remedies had long been recognized “for an invasion of personal in-
terests in liberty.”4 The Court noted in Bivens that federal courts maintained 
a unique role in protecting the Bill of Rights.5 Damages remedies would 
serve that purpose by “deter[ring] individual federal officers from commit-
ting constitutional violations.”6 Since 1971, Bivens has allowed federal courts 
to acknowledge a cause of action against federal officials for violations of cer-
tain constitutional rights.7 Sergio’s family argued that Agent Mesa should be 
civilly liable under the Bivens doctrine for violating the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments because he shot and killed Sergio without cause.8 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the lawsuit, holding the 
Constitution provided Sergio’s family no such remedy.9 Given the Roberts 
 
 * William J. Aceves is the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at California West-
ern School of Law. Regina Calvario, Sara Emerson, Lillian Glenister, Varun Sabharwal, and 
Stacey Zumo provided excellent research assistance. I am grateful to Jessica Fink for her very 
helpful comments. All errors are my own. 
 1. 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020). 
 2. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 740. 
 3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (establishing an implied right of action for violations of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
 4. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395. 
 5. Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 6. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). 
 7. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (establishing an implied right of action 
for violations of the Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (establishing 
an implied right of action for violations of the Fifth Amendment). 
 8. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 740 (2020). 
 9. Id. at 739. 
2 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1 
Court’s skepticism of the Bivens doctrine, the decision is not surprising. It is 
consistent with a line of Supreme Court cases that has effectively ended 
Bivens remedies for constitutional violations.10 Indeed, it is a reflection of the 
Court’s continued abdication of the judiciary’s role as an adjudicator of 
rights and a coequal branch of government.11 
This Essay examines the Hernandez decision and critiques the Court’s 
expanding theory of judicial abdication, an approach with profound implica-
tions for civil rights and the future of the judiciary. While Hernandez in-
volved a cross-border shooting, the Court’s reasoning extends to all facets of 
civil litigation.12 Accordingly, this Essay proposes a new theory of judicial 
engagement that would empower federal courts to grant relief for constitu-
tional claims against federal officials. It is a theory founded in extant consti-
tutional jurisprudence that the Court has used for over a century to apply the 
Bill of Rights to state and local governments—an approach that examines 
whether a constitutional right is fundamental to our scheme of ordered lib-
erty and has deep roots in our history and tradition. This Essay proposes that 
a similar methodology be used to assess whether a civil remedy exists for vio-
lations of constitutional rights by federal officials. 
I. HERNANDEZ V. MESA: FIGHTING FOR SERGIO IN FEDERAL COURT 
On June 7, 2010, Sergio was playing with several friends in the cement 
culvert that serves as the border between the United States (El Paso, Texas) 
and Mexico (Ciudad Juárez).13 Sergio and his friends were running from the 
Mexican side of the culvert up to the U.S. side to touch the border wall.14 
While they were playing, Agent Mesa arrived on the U.S. side of the border.15 
At the same time, smugglers were allegedly in the vicinity and throwing 
rocks at Border Patrol agents.16 Mesa then shot at Sergio through the border 
 
 10. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 
(2012); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 11. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that gerryman-
dering claims raise nonjusticiable political questions). See generally Linda Greenhouse, Who 
Will Be Left Standing in the Supreme Court?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/16/opinion/supreme-court-trump.html [https://perma.cc
/TPZ4-YHJ5]. 
 12. Cross-border shootings are not unique. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 
3d 1025 (D. Ariz. 2015), vacated, 800 F. App’x 535 (2020); see also Mark Binelli, 10 Shots Across 
the Border, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06
/magazine/10-shots-across-the-border.html [https://perma.cc/6DLV-VQWG]. 
 13. See Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint ¶ 24, Hernandez v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 
834 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (No. 6:11-cv-00013), 2011 WL 333184 [hereinafter Hernandez Com-
plaint]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. ¶ 25. 
 16. Federal Officials Close Investigation into the Death of Sergio Hernandez-Guereca, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 27, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-close-
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wall while Sergio was on the Mexican side of the border.17 Mesa fired at least 
twice and struck Sergio in the face, killing him instantly.18 
Although the Justice Department investigated the shooting, it concluded 
that Agent Mesa should not be prosecuted. According to the investigation, 
the shooting “occurred while smugglers attempting an illegal border crossing 
hurled rocks from close range at a [Customs and Border Patrol] agent who 
was attempting to detain a suspect.”19 Under these facts, the Justice Depart-
ment determined the shooting was consistent with Border Patrol policy.20 
Mexico’s request to extradite Agent Mesa to Mexico was rejected by the U.S. 
government.21 
Sergio’s family sued several defendants, including Agent Mesa, for dam-
ages in federal district court, arguing that the use of deadly force violated the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.22 While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes civil 
rights claims against state and local government officials who violate U.S. 
constitutional rights, there is no comparable statutory basis for suing federal 
officials.23 Accordingly, Sergio’s family pursued a Bivens claim.24 
Initially, the district court dismissed the lawsuit.25 After the plaintiffs 
amended their complaint, the district court again dismissed their claims, and 
this decision was upheld on appeal except as to the claim against Agent Me-
sa.26 The Fifth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s dismissal as to all de-
fendants upon en banc review.27 The en banc panel held Sergio’s family 
could not assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment because Sergio was a 
Mexican citizen who was on Mexican territory at the time of the shooting.28 
As to the Fifth Amendment claim, the court held that Agent Mesa was enti-
tled to qualified immunity because the viability of a Fifth Amendment claim 
 
investigation-death-sergio-hernandez-guereca [https://perma.cc/27U8-EE5K] [hereinafter 
DOJ Press Release]. 
 17. See Hernandez Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 25. 
 18. Id. 
 19. DOJ Press Release, supra note 16. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Adam Liptak, An Agent Shot a Boy Across the U.S. Border. Can His Parents Sue?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/us/politics/an-agent-shot-a-
boy-across-the-us-border-can-his-parents-sue.html [https://perma.cc/YJ9X-RDCZ]. 
 22. Hernandez Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 1. 
 23. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 747 (2020). 
 24. Hernandez Complaint, supra note 13, ¶ 1. 
 25. Hernandez v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Tex. 2011), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc per curiam, 785 F.3d 117 (5th 
Cir. 2015), vacated per curiam sub nom Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 26. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc per 
curiam, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated per curiam sub nom Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. 
Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 27. Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam), 
vacated per curiam sub nom Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 28. Id. at 119. 
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in the context of a cross-border shooting had not been clearly established at 
the time of the shooting.29 
In June 2016, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam ruling that vacated 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case so the lower court could 
consider the Bivens claims in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in 
Ziglar v. Abassi, a case involving the Bivens doctrine.30 In Ziglar, the Supreme 
Court had rejected a Bivens claim against federal agents involved in detain-
ing hundreds of non-U.S. citizens in the United States after 9/11.31 The 
Court in Ziglar used a two-part test for assessing whether a Bivens remedy 
was warranted. First, the Court considered whether the pending case differed 
in a meaningful way from the Court’s previous decisions upholding a Bivens 
remedy.32 If the case was similar to the factual context of these prior deci-
sions, the Bivens claim could continue. If not, the Court then considered 
whether “special factors” counseled against recognizing a Bivens remedy.33 
Following remand, the Fifth Circuit again considered and dismissed the 
case.34 The court held that a Bivens action was not available because the 
claims brought against Agent Mesa were unique, and special factors coun-
seled against recognizing a private right of action in the case.35 These special 
factors included the cross-border nature of the lawsuit and its national secu-
rity implications.36 In contrast, the two dissenting judges argued that a 
Bivens remedy was appropriate in this case. They rejected the majority’s as-
sertion that the case raised national security concerns, stating, “[A]s we say 
in Texas,” the contention is “all hat, no cattle.”37 
On May 28, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address 
“[w]hether, when plaintiffs plausibly allege that a rogue federal law enforce-
ment officer violated clearly established Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights 
for which there is no alternative legal remedy, the federal courts can and 
should recognize a damages claim under Bivens.”38 
II.  HERNANDEZ AND “BIVENS OR NOTHING” 
Written by Justice Alito, the Hernandez decision affirmed the lower 
court rulings and denied relief to Sergio’s family.39 The decision follows a 
 
 29. Id. at 121. 
 30. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam). 
 31. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). In Ziglar, the plaintiffs alleged they were 
detained indefinitely because of their race, ethnicity, and national origin. 
 32. Id. at 1859. 
 33. Id. at 1857 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)). 
 34. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 35. Id. at 814. 
 36. Id. at 818–19. 
 37. Id. at 825 (Prado, J., dissenting). 
 38. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 
17-1678). 
 39. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020). 
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consistent narrative from recent years, where the Court has repeatedly weak-
ened judicial review—in this case, by declining to recognize the power of 
federal judges to develop implied causes of action for constitutional viola-
tions. 
In assessing whether a Bivens remedy was available, the Court first con-
sidered whether the petitioners’ claims involved a “new context” or a “new 
category of defendants” that was different from cases previously recognized 
by the Court.40 It concluded that the cross-border nature of the claims in the 
case was “meaningfully different” from previous Bivens cases.41 Having es-
tablished the petitioners’ claims arose in a new context, the Court then con-
sidered whether special factors counseled hesitation in extending a Bivens 
remedy to these claims.42 
The Court identified three distinct factors that counseled against recog-
nizing the petitioners’ claims for relief. First, the Court considered the impli-
cations of a decision on U.S. foreign relations. According to Justice Alito, the 
cross-border nature of the underlying claims was significant. “A cross-
border shooting is by definition an international incident; it involves an 
event that occurs simultaneously in two countries and affects both countries’ 
interests. Such an incident may lead to a disagreement between those coun-
tries, as happened in this case.”43 In such cases, Justice Alito believed litiga-
tion was unwarranted. “In the absence of judicial intervention,” the Court 
suggested, “the United States and Mexico would . . . reconcile their interests 
through diplomacy.”44 
Second, the Court indicated the case would affect national security and, 
in particular, security at the U.S.-Mexico border. The decision referenced the 
large flow of people and goods between the two countries, which included 
“illegal cross-border traffic.”45 In this context, border agents played an essen-
tial role in preventing the illegal entry of both people and goods.46 The na-
tional security implications of “regulating the conduct of agents at the 
border” also counseled against recognizing a Bivens remedy.47 
Finally, the Court considered it significant that Congress had declined to 
provide civil remedies in several statutes for harms inflicted abroad by feder-
al officers. For example, the Court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which pro-
vides a cause of action against state and local officials for the deprivation of 
constitutional rights, was explicitly limited to U.S. citizens or other persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States.48 Similarly, the Torture Victim 
 
 40. Id. at 743 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)). 
 41. Id. at 743–44. 
 42. Id. at 744. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 745. 
 45. Id. at 746. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 747. 
 48. Id. (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)). 
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Protection Act, codified as a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350, was limited to claims 
against a person “who acted under the authority of a foreign state.”49 Ac-
cording to Justice Alito, these statutes were relevant for considering the 
Bivens claims in Hernandez because they indicated that Congress had “taken 
care to preclude claims for injuries that occurred abroad.”50 
The Court distilled these distinct considerations into a single concern: 
“respect for the separation of powers.”51 Citing its prior decisions, the Court 
asserted the judiciary is ill-equipped to address the myriad of issues arising 
out of cases involving “the delicate web of international relations.”52 In these 
cases, Congress and the President are better suited to provide redress. 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch issued a concurring opinion, which called 
on the Court to abandon the Bivens doctrine altogether.53 Their concurrence 
highlighted how Bivens was an anomaly in the Court’s jurisprudence, and 
how it had been significantly limited in subsequent cases to the point of ir-
relevance.54 In contrast, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Kagan, 
and Sotomayor, dissented from the Court’s opinion. Unlike the majority, the 
dissent framed the petitioners’ claims against Agent Mesa as falling within 
existing Bivens jurisprudence.55 But even if their claims could be categorized 
as “new,” no special factors counseled hesitation in recognizing a constitu-
tional claim.56 Neither foreign policy nor national security concerns, which 
were at most conjectural, justified dismissing the claims.57 For the dissent, it 
was significant that no other remedies were available and that “to redress in-
juries like the one suffered here, it is Bivens or nothing.”58 
III. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL ABDICATION 
There are many puzzling aspects to the Court’s decision in Hernandez. 
Yet, there is also a unifying theme—judicial abdication. Throughout the 
Hernandez opinion, the Court continues its drive to weaken judicial authori-
ty by limiting the ability of individuals to file civil claims in federal court and 
instead deferring to Congress and the President for relief. 
 
 49. Id. at 748–49 (referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2018)). 
 50. Id. at 749. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. at 751–53. 
 55. Id. at 756–57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 757. 
 57. Id. at 757–59. 
 58. Id. at 760 (referencing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan J., concurring in the judgment) (“For people in 
Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”)). 
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A. Foreign Affairs Obfuscation 
In Hernandez, the Court uses foreign policy and national security to jus-
tify its reasoning, but its decision extends well beyond these realms. For ex-
ample, the Court offers a unique understanding of judicial review, one that 
removes judges from their historic roles as neutral actors. In justifying the 
Court’s refusal to recognize the petitioners’ claims, Justice Alito suggests a 
contrary outcome would directly inject the Court into an international dis-
pute.59 According to Justice Alito, “[w]hen a third party intervenes and takes 
sides in a dispute between two countries, one country is likely to be pleased 
and the other displeased. But no matter which side the third party supports, 
it will have injected itself into their relations.”60 As a factual matter, this 
statement disregards that Hernandez was a civil lawsuit between two private 
parties, and neither Mexico nor the United States were litigants before the 
Court.61 While Justice Alito offers this statement in the context of a dispute 
between two countries, the dynamic he describes is not unique to interstate 
conflicts.62 It would apply to any dispute between two parties. 
This is an odd statement for any court, let alone the Supreme Court, to 
make. Justice Alito suggests that a judge who agrees to hear a case is both in-
tervening in the dispute and taking sides. This view seems to cast judges as 
actual parties to litigation, akin to Rule 24 intervenors.63 Yet this perspective 
is contrary to the most basic principles of judicial review in an adversarial 
system.64 Courts do not intervene in litigation when they are asked to adjudi-
cate disputes. Judges do not become parties when they write their decisions. 
 
 59. See id. at 744–45 (majority opinion). Of course, the Court’s refusal to consider the 
case also has international consequences. See id. at 759 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Withhold-
ing a Bivens suit here threatens to exacerbate bilateral relations, and in no way fosters our in-
ternational commitments.” (citations omitted)). 
 60. Id. at 745 n.3 (majority opinion). Justice Alito also equated judicial review in the 
case to arbitration, indicating “[i]t is not our task to arbitrate between” the United States and 
Mexico. Id. 
 61. While the petitioners initially sued the United States, only Agent Mesa was left in 
the litigation when the case was argued before the Court. However, both the United States and 
Mexico submitted amicus briefs to the Court. See Brief of the Gov’t of the United Mexican 
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) 
(No. 17-1678); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Hernan-
dez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678). There were, in fact, nineteen amicus briefs 
filed in the case. 
 62. Domestic and international tribunals share similar features and challenges. See SHAI 
DOTHAN, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW: WHEN SHOULD INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
INTERVENE? (Andreas Føllesdal & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2020). 
 63. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
 64. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (“In our adversar-
ial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation.”); Greenlaw v. United 
States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (“[W]e rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and 
assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”). 
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They issue legal opinions based on legal principles; they do not take sides. In 
fact, judges are prohibited from doing so.65 
This is not meant to suggest that judicial decisions will not result in out-
comes that support the legal arguments of one side. This is inevitable in an 
adversarial system. But this is quite different from the proposition that judg-
es effectively become advocates for one side by deciding to hear a case. Such 
an interpretation simply perpetuates the politicization of the judiciary.66 
In fact, judicial review can defuse tension between two parties when a 
conflict enters the legal process. Courts bring neutrality to a dispute.67 As 
long as their decisions comply with due process and are guided by extant le-
gal norms, courts will be seen as credible and their decisions as legitimate.68 
Courts are thus an integral part of democratic governance, and their deci-
sions should not be considered “an embarrassment to the United States or to 
the executive branch,” a point Justice Kagan raised at oral argument.69 
Throughout the majority opinion, the Court invokes the talismans of 
bygone cases in support of judicial abdication—asserting the lawsuit raised 
the fear of “ ‘embarrassment of our government abroad’ through ‘multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question,’ ” and that 
“special factors . . . counse[l] hesitation.”70 In fact, the Court elevates these 
talismanic incantations to almost mythical proportions, indicating that for-
eign policy and national security cases “involve large elements of prophe-
cy.”71 However, the Court fails to explain why these cases require divination 
 
 65. Federal common law requires judges to recuse themselves from litigation when they 
are a party. In 1927, the Supreme Court recognized that judges must recuse themselves from a 
case when they have “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 
U.S. 510, 523 (1927). The Court traced this principle to The Federalist Papers, and its admoni-
tion that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would cer-
tainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.” THE FEDERALIST No. 10, 
at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
556 U.S. 868 (2009). This principle is now codified in the federal code, which requires disquali-
fication when judges or their close family members are a party to the proceedings. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(b)(5)(i) (2018). 
 66. See generally David Russell, Politicization in the Federal Judiciary and Its Effect on 
the Federal Judicial Function, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM 21 (2018). 
 67. Martin Shapiro has observed that courts transform disputes from dyadic to triadic 
relationships. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1 (1981). 
 68. MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 
212 (2002). In the absence of enforcement mechanisms, legitimacy is essential to judicial pow-
er. See Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153, 
155 (2013). 
 69. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 
17-1678) [hereinafter Hernandez Transcript]. 
 70. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 744 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, su-
pra note 61, at 18); id. at 743 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017)) (alteration 
in original). 
 71. Id. at 749 (quoting Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1414 (2018) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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any more than cases involving purely domestic matters.72 Legal analysis in-
volves reasoned analysis, and prophecy is best left to fortune-tellers. 
B. An Ahistorical Approach 
For a Court that regularly invokes history for guidance in constitutional 
interpretation, it is striking how the Hernandez decision ignores the histori-
cal record involving civil actions against federal officials. From the earliest 
years of the Republic and into the twentieth century, the federal courts rec-
ognized common law claims for intentional torts by federal officers.73 Yet 
when the petitioners referenced this common law history, the Court re-
sponded by quoting the admonition in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that 
“[t]here is no federal general common law” and stating that “federal courts 
today cannot fashion new claims in the way that they could before 1938.”74 
It is true that Erie held there was no federal general common law.75 It is 
also true that this decision represented a profound change in how federal 
courts managed the common law.76 But Erie has never stood for the proposi-
tion that federal common law ceased to exist or that federal courts do not re-
tain their inherent federal common law powers.77 Erie was a diversity case, 
and its reference to federal general common law was limited to such cases.78 
As the Court itself recognized in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Erie decision 
simply narrowed the realm of federal common law to “havens of specialty” 
and “interstitial areas of particular federal interest.”79 
 
 72. Id. at 758 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). During oral argument, Justice Kagan repeatedly 
asked the Principal Deputy Solicitor General for examples of the foreign policy concerns raised 
by the litigation. Hernandez Transcript, supra note 69, at 59–62. 
 73. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); Mitch-
ell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1852); Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 
(1836); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
 74. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 742 (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
(1938) (alteration in original)). 
 75. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See generally Alfred Hill, Consti-
tutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969). 
 76. See Albert J. Schweppe, What Has Happened to Federal Jurisprudence?, 24 A.B.A. J. 
421 (1938). 
 77. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary 
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 878 (2007); 
Philip C. Jessup, Editorial Comment, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to 
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740 (1939). 
 78. 304 U.S. at 71, 78. On the same day that Erie was decided, the Supreme Court issued 
an opinion upholding the application of federal common law in a dispute involving water 
rights. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); see also 
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (“Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent.”). 
 79. 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004); see also Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (assessing 
claims of foreign official immunity under federal common law). 
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To justify its denial of a Bivens remedy, the Court also cites recent cases 
that have rejected implied causes of action arising out of federal statutes.80 
Citing Alexander v. Sandoval, the Court indicates that “a federal court’s au-
thority to recognize a damages remedy must rest at bottom on a statute en-
acted by Congress.”81 But this argument disregards the unique role of the 
Supreme Court in protecting the Constitution. By definition, federal statutes 
are the purview of Congress, which is free to address or ignore remedial 
mechanisms for statutory breaches. The Constitution, however, is different, 
and it has never depended exclusively on Congress or the President for its 
protection.82 Nor should it. In fact, remedial mechanisms for constitutional 
violations have long been within the Court’s purview.83 In the seminal deci-
sion on judicial review, Justice Marshall cited Blackstone for the proposition 
that “where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy” and that such 
injuries “are cognizable by the courts of the common law.”84 Whether refer-
enced in classic terms (ubi jus ibi remedium) or contemporary language (a 
right without a remedy is “nothing more than a nice idea”), judicial remedies 
for constitutional violations are steeped in history and necessary to protect 
basic rights.85 
The Court’s ahistorical approach to constitutional remedies is further 
evidenced by its treatment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of ac-
tion against state and local officials for “the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” but limits such claims to 
“citizen[s] of the United States or other person[s] within the jurisdiction 
 
 80. At the same time, the Court disregarded the language of the Westfall Act, which 
immunizes federal officers from state common law tort claims but establishes a clear exception 
for actions involving “a violation of the Constitution of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2679(b)(2)(A) (2018). See generally Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the 
Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (2013). 
 81. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275, 286 (2001)). However, Alexander did not address constitutional claims. Rather, it ad-
dressed whether private individuals could sue to enforce regulations promulgated under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 82. See George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs—Have the 
Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 283, 299 (1989) (“In treating Bivens plaintiffs the 
same way it treats statutory plaintiffs, the Court has adopted a course of action urged in anoth-
er context: Just say no.”). 
 83. See generally Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995); Ryan D. Newman, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied 
Constitutional Remedies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEX. L. REV. 471, 473–75 (2006); 
Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117 
(1989). 
 84. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23, *109). 
 85. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy 
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004); see also EDWIN N. GARLAN, LEGAL 
REALISM AND JUSTICE 44 (1941); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing 
Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 735–36 (1992). 
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thereof.”86 The Court found it significant that Congress had explicitly limited 
the statute to U.S. citizens or other persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States.87 Section 1983 was adopted in 1871 by Congress “in response 
to the widespread deprivations of civil rights in the Southern States and the 
inability or unwillingness of authorities in those States to protect those rights 
or punish wrongdoers.”88 When Congress authorized civil claims against 
state and local officials who violate the Constitution, it was targeting viola-
tions of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments by these of-
ficials.89 The statute’s domestic focus is revealed by one of its more common 
names—the Ku Klux Klan Act.90 Instead of acknowledging the statute’s 
provenance, the Court asserts “the limited scope of § 1983 weighs against 
recognition of the Bivens claim at issue here.”91 There is another historical 
reason why § 1983 should not be used to restrict Bivens. In 1871, the most 
likely perpetrators of intentional torts committed abroad would have been 
federal officials, and claims against them were already available through the 
common law.92 
C. Separation of Powers Anxiety 
Hernandez is the latest iteration of the Court’s expanding theory of judi-
cial abdication.93 The Court indicates its decision is premised on “respect for 
the separation of powers.”94 And yet, the decision evinces a lack of respect 
for the Court’s own power.95 The Court rejects the original understanding of 
 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 87. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 747 (2020). 
 88. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 147 (1988). 
 89. See Will Maslow & Joseph B. Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for 
Equality, 1862–1952, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 369–70 (1953). 
 90. See generally Paul J. Gardner, Private Enforcement of Constitutional Guarantees in 
the Ku Klux Act of 1871, CONST. STUD., 2016, at 81 (discussing the history of the Ku Klux Klan 
Act’s private right of action); Maslow & Robison, supra note 89. 
 91. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 747. 
 92. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1852); Little v. Barreme, 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
 93. Complaints of judicial abdication have been raised by both conservatives and liber-
als. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court Just Abdicated its Most Important Role: 
Enforcing the Constitution, BERKELEY BLOG (June 28, 2019), https://blogs.berkeley.edu
/2019/06/28/the-supreme-court-just-abdicated-its-most-important-role-enforcing-the-
constitution/ [https://perma.cc/3PDA-JL4K]; Editorial, Judicial Activism and Judicial Abdica-
tion, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 7, 2014, 7:58 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/10/judicial-
activism-and-judicial-abdication-editors/ [https://perma.cc/XJ7Q-7A4N]; Jaba Tsitsuashvili, 
Judicial Abdication at the Supreme Court, INST. FOR JUST. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://ij.org/cje-
post/judicial-abdication-at-the-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/U5UK-8EP7]. 
 94. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 749. 
 95. But see ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016) (arguing the judiciary abnegates its authority to the adminis-
trative state in cases involving foreign relations). See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL 
QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992) 
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judicial authority under the common law, which empowered federal courts 
to grant relief for harms inflicted by federal officials. It questions the ability 
of judges to manage cases with any international connections. It also negates 
the judiciary’s unique role in protecting the Constitution.96 
Time and again, the Roberts Court has issued decisions making it more 
difficult for litigants to bring civil actions in federal courts, further weaken-
ing the judicial power. This theme is present across a variety of issues. The 
Court has imposed heightened pleading requirements in civil litigation.97 It 
has adopted narrow interpretations of federal statutes to limit human rights 
litigation and transported principles of statutory construction beyond their 
historic application to further limit these lawsuits.98 And, it has routinely re-
jected civil rights claims filed under Bivens.99 If the Court overturns Bivens—
as Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have explicitly sought—it will have abdicat-
ed its historic role and ceded a significant portion of its judicial authority to 
the President and Congress.100 In an era when the unitary executive theory 
has been championed within an imperial presidency, this is a dangerous de-
velopment for the rule of law.101 Judicial review is an essential check to exec-
utive and legislative overreach, particularly in the realm of constitutional 
rights. 
 
(arguing there are no reasons, including constitutional and policy considerations, for judicial 
abdication in foreign relations cases). 
 96. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 211 (1962), and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)) (describing the Su-
preme Court as “the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution”); see also Thurgood Marshall, 
The Supreme Court as Protector of Civil Rights: Equal Protection of the Laws, 275 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 101 (1951). 
 97. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007). 
 98. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
 99. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1858–63 (2017). 
 100. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 753 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 101. See Matt Ford, A Courtier for the Imperial Presidency, NEW REPUBLIC (July 23, 
2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/150112/brett-kavanaugh-courtier-imperial-presidency 
[https://perma.cc/J9M3-YHPW]; Kevin D. Williamson, Pruning the Presidency, NAT’L REV. 
(Nov. 27, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/11/executive-overreach-
imperial-presidency-congress-must-reclaim-proper-place-constitutional-order/ [https://perma
.cc/PA7B-PCF3]. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (First 
Mariner Books ed. 2004, Houghton Mifflin Co. 1973) (detailing and championing the histori-
cal development of the executive branch as the strongest branch); John Yoo, Unitary, Execu-
tive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1935 (2009) (book review) (critiquing a narrow conception of 
the unitary executive that does not also include implied executive powers). 
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IV. PROMOTING A NEW THEORY OF JUDICIAL AFFIRMATION 
In 1971, the Supreme Court issued Bivens to give meaning to constitu-
tional norms.102 Bivens also remedied a constitutional anomaly—if state and 
local officials could be subject to civil liability for violating constitutional 
rights, then federal officials should be subject to similar liability.103 There is 
little reason to distinguish among federal, state, and local government offi-
cials who violate constitutional rights. Yet the Court’s recent jurisprudence 
rejects this reasoning, and the Hernandez decision perpetuates this distinc-
tion.104 If the Court becomes interested in resolving this anomaly, there is an 
intriguing solution living within its own jurisprudence. Providing a remedy 
is, in fact, a constitutional obligation.105 
Originally, the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal government.106 
The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 provided the Court an 
opportunity to extend constitutional provisions to state and local govern-
ments. However, the Court’s initial interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases was exceedingly narrow, thereby 
limiting its application.107 This reluctance eventually gave way to a gradual 
yet forceful process of selective incorporation.108 The Court did not wait for 
another constitutional amendment or even statutory authorization to act. 
 
 102. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388, 402 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme 
Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 n.125 
(1975) (“I think that Bivens is an explicit recognition that the constitutional guarantee embrac-
es a right of action . . .which is enforceable by any appropriate remedy including damages, in 
either the state or federal courts.” (citation omitted)). 
 103. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1749–50 (1991); James E. Pfander & David 
Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117 
(2009). 
 104. In fact, the Court’s parade of horribles concerning foreign policy and national secu-
rity concerns would presumably apply to lawsuits filed against state and local officials pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and yet the Court failed to provide any explanation for why these cases 
should be treated differently. 
 105. See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1972) (arguing that with respect to constitutional norms, “there is 
much to be said for a judicial prerogative to fashion remedies that give flesh to the word and 
fulfillment to the promise those norms embody”); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 103, at 1788 
(“The Constitution thus contemplates a judicial ‘check’ on the political branches not merely to 
redress particular violations, but to ensure that government generally respects constitutional 
values—one of the hallmarks of the rule of law.”); cf. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 
66 (2001) (“Our authority to imply a new constitutional tort, not expressly authorized by stat-
ute, is anchored in our general jurisdiction to decide all cases ‘arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.’ ” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018))). 
 106. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 253 (1833). See generally ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 504–05 (6th ed. 2019). 
 107. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 108. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 
78 (1908); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
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Quite simply, the Court recognized there was no meaningful reason for lim-
iting the application of the Bill of Rights and for not applying these norms to 
all government actors.109 Accordingly, the Court began applying discrete 
provisions of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, a process of selective incorporation that the Court still 
uses.110 In determining whether a provision in the Bill of Rights applies to 
state and local governments, the Court considers if the right is “fundamental 
to our scheme of ordered liberty” and has “dee[p] root[s] in [our] history 
and tradition.”111 Today, all but three provisions in the Bill of Rights have 
been selectively incorporated and applied to state and local governments.112 
As Justice Kavanaugh asked during oral argument in a recent case, is it “just 
too late in the day to argue that any of the Bill of Rights is not incorpo-
rated?”113 
The Court can use this same reasoning to assess civil liability for viola-
tions of constitutional rights: Is a remedy for discrete constitutional viola-
tions by federal officials fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, and 
does it have deep roots in our history and tradition? This analysis would re-
place the existing two-step Bivens framework. Like selective incorporation, 
the analysis would be conducted on a case-by-case basis. It would assess the 
historical record associated with the underlying constitutional right: Have 
violations of the right historically given rise to civil actions?114 It would also 
consider whether recognizing an implied right of action—to deter wrongful 
government action and provide redress to the individuals whose rights have 
been violated—is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty.115 Echoing 
 
 109. Cf. Brown, supra note 82, at 263 (“It creates symmetry within the legal system by 
placing plaintiffs who claim damages from constitutional violations by federal officials on the 
same footing as plaintiffs with similar claims against state and local officials.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (holding the Eighth Amendment’s 
protection from excessive fines is incorporated and applies to the states). 
 111. Id. at 686–87 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)) (al-
terations in original). 
 112. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 106, at 531. 
 113. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Timbs, 139 S. Ct. 682 (No. 17-1091). Justice Gor-
such shared this perspective by noting, “And here we are in 2018 . . . still litigating incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights. Really?” Id. at 32–33. 
 114. In deciding whether to apply a provision of the Bill of Rights to state and local gov-
ernments, the Court has used an expansive approach to establish whether a particular right 
exists in “this Nation’s history and tradition.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 
(2010). It reaches into English history, examines the colonial era, and reviews subsequent prac-
tice in the United States before and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., 
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687–89; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–628 (2008). See 
generally Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions 
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in 
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2008); Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. 
Agudo & Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are 
Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451 (2012). 
 115. In Palko v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects only those rights that are “of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.” 302 U.S. 
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selective incorporation, this methodology distinguishes between the exist-
ence of an implied right of action and the scope of that right.116 
The incorporation doctrine is instructive for another proposition. The 
right to a remedy for constitutional violations should not vary based on 
whether the violations are committed by federal, state, or local officials. As 
the Court has stated, “if a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, there is 
no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires.”117 
The same reasoning should apply to constitutional remedies.118 Thus, § 1983 
should be informative but not dispositive when the Court is assessing claims 
for relief against federal officials.119 To the extent § 1983 imposes any limita-
tions on claims for relief against state and local officials, the Court would 
need to determine whether to impose similar limitations on claims for relief 
against federal officials, or whether such limitations are contrary to history 
and tradition as well as our scheme of ordered liberty. That constitutional 
claims—steeped in countermajoritarian values—would be more expansive 
than statutory claims—which are subject to congressional fiat—should not 
be surprising.120 And given the Court’s historic role in protecting the Bill of 
Rights, allowing Congress to restrict the scope of relief available for constitu-
tional violations would surely raise separation of powers concerns. 
For Sergio’s family, the outcome of this constitutional analysis would be 
evident—the murder of an unarmed child by the ultra vires actions of a gov-
 
319, 325 (1937). Such rights constitute “a ‘principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ ” Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
 116. The Court highlighted this distinction in Ramos v. Louisiana: “The scope of an in-
corporated right and whether a right is incorporated at all are two different questions.” 140 S. 
Ct. 1390, 1405 n.63 (2020). 
 117. Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687. 
 118. See generally Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Reme-
dies, How It Changed, and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132 (2012) (arguing 
that existing scholarship fails to consider the proper relationship between the Constitution and 
common law remedies); James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: 
Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862 
(2010) (comparing antebellum indemnification practices with current qualified immunity 
standards); Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Reme-
dies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 121 (1997) (providing an example of where a common law remedy was 
found to be constitutionally required). 
 119. An alternative approach that accepts distinct forms of relief for constitutional viola-
tions committed by federal, state, and local officials is clearly disfavored. In the incorporation 
realm, the Supreme Court has clearly rejected “the idea that a single right can mean two differ-
ent things depending on whether it is being invoked against the federal or a state government.” 
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1398. 
 120. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The very pur-
pose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as 
legal principles to be applied by the courts.”); see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 103, at 1788 
(“Within the constitutional scheme, an important role of the judiciary is to represent the peo-
ple’s continuing interest in the protection of long-term values, of which popular majorities, no 
less than their elected representatives, might sometimes lose sight.”). 
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ernment agent has long been recognized as the type of action that can give 
rise to civil claims.121 This does not resolve the ultimate question of liability. 
But this determination would allow the Hernández family to have their 
claims heard and adjudicated, ensuring that Sergio’s legacy extends beyond 
the concrete ground where he fell.122 And, it would reverse the Supreme 
Court’s trajectory from abdication to affirmation of the federal judicial pow-
er. 
 
 121. As petitioners in Hernandez argued to the Court, Texas law expressly recognized a 
tort remedy even when the wrongful act causing the injury occurred in a foreign country. Brief 
for the Petitioners at 19, Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678) (citing Del-
gado v. Zaragoza, 267 F. Supp. 3d 892, 898 (W.D. Tex. 2016)). Indeed, this right of action exist-
ed in Texas law since at least 1913. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 675–76 
(Tex. 1990). 
 122. This would address another flaw in the Supreme Court’s approach to Bivens litiga-
tion—the assumption that these cases are only about money. They are not. They are also about 
providing victims a voice before a neutral tribunal. They are about acknowledging the painful 
loss of a young child. They are about denouncing the wrongful acts that caused this loss and 
identifying the perpetrators. These are essential features of civil litigation and something the 
Supreme Court often ignores. In its amicus submission to the Court, the United States also 
disregards these features of civil litigation and instead focuses on the financial aspects of Bivens 
actions. See Brief for the United States, supra note 61, at 24–25. 
